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Abstract 
In this paper we explore a case for judicial review brought against the Secretary of State for International 
Development by an Ethiopian national, Mr O. The claimant alleged that the Department for International 
Development (DfID) had failed adequately to assess evidence of human rights violations in Ethiopia to which 
funds provided by DfID had contributed. Warby J ruled that the claim merited a full hearing. DfID is 
unaccustomed to judicial review: the O case is the first time since the 1995 Pergau Dam case that UK 
development aid has been reviewed by the courts. We study Warby J͛s judgment and its implications for 
accountabiity for aid decisions. We argue that both the wider context for aid and the legal framework 
governing development assistance have changed significantly in the 20 or so years since Pergau. In particular, 
we show that despite the UK͛s new legal commitment, made in 2015, to spend 0.7% of gross national income 
(GNI) on official development assistance, the existing mechanisms for scrutinising aid decisions are 
inadequate. We argue that there is an accountability gap in relation to the UK͛s now considerable 
development spending and explore the role of judicial review in this context. Keywords: international 
development; aid; judicial review; Pergau Dam 
Introduction 
In July 2014, a case for judicial review brought against the Secretary of State for International 
Development by an Ethiopian national known as Mr O passed the permission stage.1 The claimant 
alleged that the Department for International Development (DfID) had failed adequately to assess 
evidence of human rights violations in Ethiopia to which it was said funds provided by DfID under 
the Promotion of Basic Services (PBS) Programme had contributed. Warby J ruled that the claim 
merited a full hearing. On 26 February 2015, DfID announced that it was terminating its support for 
the PBS programme.2 DfID͛s statement emphasised that its decision to withdraw from support was 
unconnected to permission being granted for a full hearing of Mr O͛s claim. 
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The permission stage of judicial review constitutes a considerable hurdle.2 The O case is the first 
time since the leading case of R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p World Development 
Movement Ltd3 (the Pergau Dam case) that UK development aid has been subject to judicial review. 
For this reason, the O ruling has been described as ͚an important step towards greater accountability 
in development assistance͛.4 In this regard, it can be likened to the Client Earth case, which opened 
the door to judicial scrutiny of the UK͛s air quality plans and indicated the willingness of the courts 
to review the substance of government policy.5 In this paper, we study Warby J͛s judgment with two 
aims. First, we draw out the implications of the case for aid accountability. We argue that both the 
wider context for UK aid and the legal framework governing development assistance have changed 
significantly in the 20 or so years since Pergau Dam. DfID – created in the wake of Pergau Dam to 
replace the Overseas Development Administration – has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny. It 
has been subjected to only weak non-judicial scrutiny of its spending. At the same time, a concerted 
campaign by DfID and others in the development community led to the UK making a new legal 
commitment in 2015 to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on official development 
assistance.6Despite this unprecedented legal commitment, the existing mechanisms for scrutinising 
aid decisions are inadequate.7 
Our second aim is to use the example of aid as a unique sphere of public spending to explore 
wider questions of mechanisms for transnational accountability. We argue that whereas in other 
areas of public spending, accountability for decisions is directly to the UK electorate8 what is unique 
about aid is that spending takes place extra-territorially. Seen in this light, willingness to open up 
development aid to judicial and other scrutiny can be said to be a matter of extra-territorial justice. 
Parliament and its relevant select committees should be in the frontline of scrutiny, but, failing this, 
the courts have a role to play. The O case is important because it allows us to explore the attitude of 
the courts to reviewing cases in which the alleged wrongdoing did not take place in the UK. The 
case raised important questions about the effective protection of citizens in aid recipient countries. 
It is a fundamental principle of international law that human rights and good governance are integral 
to development programmes, not optional add-ons. But projects funded by aid may be implemented 
in ways which violate the basic civil and social rights of individual citizens. Poor planning may lead 
to a skewing of priorities and damage to local economies. Of course it is for national authorities to 
address these problems in the first instance. But corruption, inertia and a lack of resources mean that 
local parliaments often fail to take account of the views of affected communities, and courts are 
unwilling to investigate violations after they happen. In practice accountability mechanisms in donor 
countries may offer the only realistic forum for monitoring the consequences of aid projects in 
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partner countries. We argue that if parliament and the courts were unwilling to scrutinise such 
projects, a significant ͚accountability gap͛ would be created. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide the background to the O case. 
In Section 2, we consider how the landscape of aid has changed since the Pergau Dam case. In 
particular, we argue that the DfID has become one of Whitehall͛s most powerful and wealthiest 
departments and that the UK͛s legal commitment to spend 0.7% GNI on official development 
assistance from 2015 raises a number of new and important questions relating to accountability and 
scrutiny. In the section that follows, we explore the issues that arose in the O case. We distinguish 
the approach taken in this case to that which characterised Pergau Dam and put both cases in their 
wider public law context. In Section 4, we build on these observations to make the case for 
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of aid, arguing that thus far there have not been adequate 
mechanisms for scrutinising the disbursement of a large aid budget and that there are characteristics 
unique to the aid relationship that mean that judicial and other oversight is both necessary and 
desirable. In Section 5, we make some tentative suggestions as to the likely impact of the case. 
1. Background to the case 
In a statement of claim prepared by Leigh Day, Mr O – who at the time of the case was living in a 
refugee camp in Kenya – claimed that funding provided by DfID for the PBS programme had 
contributed to human rights abuses by the Ethiopian government. Under this programme, DfID 
contributed, together with the World Bank and the Africa Development Bank to a multi-donor 
scheme to promote access to five basic services: education; health; water and sanitation; agriculture; 
and roads. It was claimed that the Ethiopian government had implemented the PBS programme 
through forced villagisation and that this had led to evictions and forced removals, to arbitrary 
detention and rape, and to the alienation of the land of peasant farmers without compensation in the 
Gambella region in western Ethiopia.9 
The Ethiopian government is something of a poster child for development experts and donors, 
and the UK has been a strong supporter of its ambitious development agenda and efforts in reaching 
the Millennium Development Goals. It is a major recipient of British aid (second only to Pakistan), 
receiving £370 million in official development assistance (ODA) in 2014/15.11 But critics point to 
an authoritarian government, focused on economic growth through large infrastructure projects, 
which has imprisoned dissenters, including journalists, and stifled opposition parties. The 
government͛s villagisation programme was a central feature of its development ambitions. It aimed 
to cluster communities together in order to deliver public services such as water and sanitation and 
schooling. It was carried out with the assistance of police and the military which actively participated 
in moving the population against their will. These abuses had long been documented. For example, 
Human Rights Watch had been documenting serious human rights violations since the first year of 
villagisation in 2011 in Gambella and subsequently in other regions.10 However, critics argue that 
donor countries have been silent on the abuses committed by Ethiopia͛s increasingly authoritarian 
government in order to maintain their relationship with an important strategic ally on matters of 
security, migration and peacekeeping.11 
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After Ethiopia͛s controversial disputed 2005 elections, which led to a crackdown on opposition 
parties and independent civil society (non-governmental organisations) donors including the UK 
responded by withdrawing direct budget support to the Ethiopian goverment.12 Instead, from 2006 
the first phase of the PBS programme began, with DfID contributing by funding block grants that 
aimed to provide adequate staffing and operations for the programme. The way the funding for the 
PBS was structured was intended to be more indirect because it was channelled through – rather than 
being directly received by – the Ethiopian Government and coordinated by the World Bank. The 
funding provided by DfID and other donors went towards the salaries of government officials. It was 
these officials who were said by the claimant to be carrying out villagisation under the auspices of 
the Commune Development Programme (CDP) of the government of Ethiopia.13 Leigh Day 
Solicitors claimed that during the lifetime of the PBS, which was now in its third phase (2012–2018), 
DfID had failed adequately to monitor and evaluate it, and had made no attempt to speak with those 
who had fled as a result of abuses connected with it and who had sought refugee status in Kenya. 
The proceedings against the Secretary of State for International Development, Justine Greening, 
claimed that despite being aware of allegations of abuse and being asked to investigate them, DfID 
had unlawfully failed properly to assess whether UK aid had been used to carry out forced 
villagisation. It was alleged that DfID had failed adequately to monitor how its funds were being 
used. Seeking permission for full judicial review, Mr O claimed that DfID ͚had failed adequately to 
assess Ethiopia͛s compliance with its human rights obligations which was a pre-condition for 
receiving British aid money͛.14 Agreeing that the claim merited a full hearing, Warby J granted 
permission to apply for judicial review. Thereafter, Leigh Day sought specific disclosure of the 
documentation relating to assessments carried out by DfID. In the meantime, DfID͛s partner in the 
Ethiopia programme, the World Bank, had agreed to consider allegations of human rights abuses 
associated with the PBS. In early 2015, the findings of the World Bank Inspection Panel charged 
with investigating the claims was leaked to the media.15 The panel found ͚an operational link͛ 
between the PBS programme and the CDP.16 It also found that the World Bank had neither carried 
out sufficient investigation into this nor taken action to mitigate the risk of human rights abuses. A 
month later, DfID announced that it would be ending all funding to the PBS programme, in which it 
had by now invested £745 million.17 Leigh Day responded by ending the judicial review action. 
The O case is widely viewed as a significant development in the accountability of the UK for its 
aid.18 It signaled the apparent willingness of the court to grant judicial review of an aid decision. 
Although O did not proceed to a full hearing, the judgment of Warby J granting permission for 
judicial review is thorough and detailed. As such, it presents an important opportunity to consider, 
for the first time since Pergau Dam, the approach of the courts to accountability for the Department͛s 
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aid decisions. This is an especially critical question in the new context of increased development 
funding to be disbursed by the Department. 
2. UK aid since Pergau Dam 
In this section, we explore the context for the O case and show that there have been four significant 
changes in the context for UK aid since the Pergau Dam case in 1995. In that case the decision of 
the foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, to give £316 million in aid to Malaysia for a hydroelectric 
project was challenged in the High Court by the World Development Movement. It claimed that the 
aid was disbursed in order to secure the UK͛s political and commercial relations with Malaysia and 
that the decision to do so was unlawful. In its landmark judgment, the court accepted that the decision 
was ultra vires the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980, which at that time governed 
development aid and which set out in section 1 that: 
The Secretary of State shall have power, for the purposes of promoting the development or 
maintaining the economy of a country … or the welfare of its people, to furnish any person or 
body with assistance, whether financial, technical or of any other nature. 
Rose LJ accepted the applicant͛s argument that although the word is not used in the legislation, aid 
must be given for sound development purposes because if Parliament͛s intention had been ͚to confer 
a power to disburse money for unsound developmental purposes … the statute would have said so 
expressly͛. According to the judgment, if the money had been spent for sound development purposes, 
it would have been appropriate for the Foreign Secretary to have other considerations in mind, such 
as political and economic considerations. However, in the view of the court ͚the project was so 
economically unsound that there was no economic argument in favour of it͛.19 According to 
McAuslan, the significance of the Pergau Dam case was the apparent willingness of the court ͚to 
extend judicial control to development assistance͛.20 This led to important changes in the legal 
framework governing development assistance, as we show below. 
The formation of DfID 
Before Pergau Dam, development aid was the responsibility of the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA). The ODA formed part of the Foreign Office and the minister responsible for 
development was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.21 After the criticisms levelled at the 
ODA in the Pergau case, it was felt that the creation of a new ministry responsible for development 
would shelter aid from political interference and so end ͚tied aid͛.22 It would also signal the 
importance of aid to the UK by giving the development community a distinct voice at the cabinet 
table. It was thought that this would provide development work with greater capacity to defend itself 
against political pressure in the way the ODA had not been able to do when it had come under 
pressure to use the aid budget to make possible an arms deal in the Pergau Dam affair.25 
After the election of a Labour government in 1997, a new Department for International 
Development was created and Clare Short became the first Secretary of State for International 
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Development. One of the first tasks of the new Ministry was to draft new legislation to govern its 
work.23 
The International Development Act 2002 
Patrick McAuslan argued that the Pergau Dam case led directly to the introduction of the 
International Development Act 2002, which replaced the Overseas Development and Cooperation 
Act 1980.24 The aim of the new legislation, he claimed, was to make judicial review of development 
aid more difficult. Section 1 of 2002 Act was drafted so as to broaden the grounds on which the 
Secretary of State for International Development could give aid. It provides that 
The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance if he is 
satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.25 
McAuslan argued that UK aid decisions were very unlikely to fall outwith this broad provision: it 
was now highly unlikely that any decisions by the Secretary of State for International Development 
could be found to be ultra vires in the way that had occurred in the Pergau Dam case. The fact that 
over 20 years would elapse before development aid was once again the subject of a judicial review 
claim would seem to confirm McAuslan͛s thesis. It had indeed become more difficult to succeed in 
a claim against DfID as a result of the International Development Act 2002. As we show below, it 
is significant that when it did arise, the next judicial review of aid to come before the courts was 
framed in terms of the Department͛s procedure in assessing the PBS programme. It was not framed 
in terms of the lawfulness of the decision to lend. This is a significantly narrow approach. It focuses 
on the question of whether DfID had in place, and whether it followed, a procedure for assessing its 
programme in Ethiopia. This is in contrast to the Pergau Dam case͛s expansive approach. That case 
was organised around the larger question of the overall lawfulness of a lending decision. We return 
to this point below. 
Funding environment 
When the Pergau Dam case was decided, the wider context for aid was very different to that which 
pertains today. The aid budget was not seen as a priority of the UK government. It was widely seen 
as vulnerable to cuts. In addition, some argued, the aid budget was viewed as a honey pot by those 
outside the development industry. This explained the way in which the ODA came under pressure 
to offer aid to Malaysia to sweeten an arms deal with that country͛s government.26 By contrast the O 
case took place at a time of cross-party consensus in favour of ring-fencing, and increasing the 
amount spent on, aid. At the 2010 elections, the Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative and 
Scottish National Party manifestos had each promised to enshrine an aid pledge in law. The coalition 
agreement in 2010 then confirmed that it would bind itself to spend 0.7% of GNI on overseas aid 
from 2013.27 This promise was reiterated in every party manifesto (except that of the UK 
Independence Party) in 2015.28 There was wide consensus that the UK should be committed to 
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development assistance as part of the exercise of soft power and influence in the international 
arena.29 Although both Theresa May and the then Secretary of State for International Development, 
Priti Patel, have in the past expressed strong reservations about the UK͛s development budget, 
DfID͛s existence as a department seems set to continue and, in the wake of Brexit, to play a role in 
the promotion of the idea of 
͚Global Britain͛.30 
It is important to note that the O case therefore came before the courts at a critical time for UK 
development aid. As the case was being prepared, DfID was on the brink of bringing to completion 
a 15-year campaign to guarantee the amount to be spent on development assistance by the UK. Since 
the Jubilee campaigns for debt relief in the late 1990s, DfID had argued consistently that the UK 
must meet an OECD recommendation that the world͛s major aid donors spend 0.7% GNI on 
development assistance.34 Over the years, thanks to the tenacity of the development community, 
there emerged widespread support for this change. In 2014, a private members Bill was introduced 
to enshrine in law a provision that the UK is bound to spend 0.7% of its GNI per annum on official 
development assistance and in March 2015, the International Development (Official Development 
Assistance Target) Act received assent. This legislation provides that the UK is legally obliged to 
spend 0.7% of GNI on aid and a report must be furnished to Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
International Development should it fail to reach this target.31 
Across Whitehall, DfID is now seen as a large and powerful Ministry with significant resources 
at its disposal. In 20 years, aid has gone from being threatened with cuts to being ring-fenced. There 
is also keenness from other Whitehall departments to access the aid pot. There have been increasing 
attempts by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence, as well as 
the Department for Business and Skills (BIS), to work jointly with DfID and so to access the ODA 
budget. As Diane Abbott wrote, when she was Opposition Spokeswoman for International 
Development, ͚ the refrain ͞ Can we ODA that?͟ is now common in the corridors of the Foreign Office 
and the MoD͛.32 Examples include FCO partnerships with DfID on election monitoring funded from 
the aid budget; and Ministry of Defence navy ships sent to West Africa during the Ebola crisis funded 
by ODA.33 
Scepticism of aid 
It is important to bear in mind that alongside DfID͛s emerging position as one of the best-funded 
departments in Whitehall, there has also been a significant rise in aid scepticism in recent years. This 
has caused significant difficulties for DfID in some respects. The UK Independence Party has led 
the way in ridiculing wastage and ineffectiveness at DfID, but it has not been alone in expressing 
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reservations about aid spending.34 Its scepticism has been taken up by influential sections of the print 
media. On 13 June 2016, Parliament debated an online petition demanding a reduction in the amount 
the UK spends each year on ODA, following a Mail on Sunday campaign that had gathered over 
220,000 signatures.35 Critics of aid argue that the UK spending on development aid overseas is 
undesirable and unfair at a time of continued hardship and austerity at home. 
3. Issues arising in O v Secretary of State for International Development 
In this section, we explore the important issues raised in Warby J͛s judgment in the O case, linking 
them to the preceding discussion by distinguishing the Pergau Dam case where relevant and locating 
the case in the wider political context for aid and for judicial review set out above. 
Standing 
It is important to note that the O case arose in a wider context, in which the Lord Chancellor had 
raised the possibility of narrowing the grounds of standing in judicial review cases. Indeed, in its 
consultation paper on reforming judicial review, the Ministry of Justice explicitly cited the Pergau 
Dam case as one that demonstrated why judicial review needed to be reformed.36 It argued that the 
World Development Movement as claimant should not have been allowed standing. The 
consultation paper describes such cases as ͚brought by groups who seek nothing but cheap 
headlines͛.37 It is therefore interesting that in O, the next case on development aid to come before the 
courts, the Government sought to ͚prob[e] the boundaries of the tests laid down by courts͛.38 Indeed, 
it has been argued that the decision by DfiD to instruct the most senior barrister acting for the 
government clearly signals their determination to resist the granting of permission in this hearing 
and to do so in part by arguing for a narrow interpretation of the standing rules.3940 Equally, we will 
argue, the discussion of standing set out by Warby J can be interpreted as resisting the Government͛s 
attempts to narrow the rules on standing. 
Warby J͛s judgment provides a detailed and nuanced response to the question of standing. Was 
Mr O, as the Government claimed, a ͚busybody͛, a refugee who had left his homeland and who 
therefore did not have sufficient close connection with the abuses complained of to bring the action? 
For DfID, it had been argued that Mr O had neither legitimate concern nor sufficient interest in the 
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case. Warby J resisted this attempt narrowly to interpret standing. He relied on AXA General 
Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate44 and cited Lord Reed͛s judgment to the effect that: 
A requirement that the applicant demonstrate an interest in the matter complained of will not 
however operate satisfactorily if it is applied in the same way in all contexts. In some contexts, 
it is appropriate to require an applicant for judicial review to demonstrate that he has a particular 
interest in the matter complained of: the type of interest which is relevant, and therefore 
required in order to have standing, will depend upon the particular context. In other situations, 
such as where the excess or misuse of power affects the public generally, insistence upon a 
particular interest could prevent the matter being brought before the court, and that in turn 
might disable the court from performing its function to protect the rule of law … What is to be 
regarded as sufficient interest to justify a particular applicant͛s bringing a particular application 
before the court, and thus as conferring standing, depends therefore upon the context, and in 
particular upon what will best serve the purposes of judicial review in that context. 
The discussion of standing in Re O is important not only because its predecessor, Pergau Dam, was 
considered a significant development in the willingness of the UK courts liberally to interpret 
standing and so to grant locus standi to the World Development Movement.41 We would argue that, 
beyond this, Warby J showed himself to be especially sensitive to the significance of standing in 
cases relating to international development. In these cases, the courts will by definition have to 
consider claims made by those affected by UK aid decisions overseas. Warby J considered this issue 
in detail in granting permission for judicial review. It can be argued that he took an expansive view. 
He did this in two ways. Firstly, he found that sufficient evidence had been presented to support the 
contention of a likely connection between UK aid and the CDP which resulted in human rights 
abuses. In response to the requirement that ͚the Claimant must … demonstrate a sufficient factual 
case of likely linkage between the provision of UK aid and the CDP͛, Warby J accepted that Mr O 
had done so ͚not only in relation to the past but also in relation to the present and future͛. This is a 
highly significant step for the court to have taken. It will be recalled from the discussion above that 
the World Bank Inspection Panel, in its leaked report, found evidence of ͚an operational link͛ 
between the PBS and the Ethiopian government͛s CDP. This information came to light in early 2015. 
In effect, this means that an ͚operational link͛, to use the Inspection Panel͛s language, was accepted 
by Warby J before the findings of the World Bank investigation were known. In assessing whether 
Mr O could pass the significant hurdle of a sufficient factual case, the judge accepted evidence 
presented to court at a time when there was little supporting evidence in the public domain. The 
reports of human rights groups who had long gathered evidence of abuses will have been presented 
and these were clearly given due weight by Warby J. As he put it: 
The contention that the CDP has been at least indirectly funded via UK contributions to the 
PBS certainly cannot be rejected at this stage. It is therefore reasonable for the Claimant to 
contend that the Defendant͛s approach to the assessment of Ethiopia͛s human rights record, and 
hence to the disbursement of aid, may have had a causal impact on the implementation of the 
CDP in the past, and that the same is likely to be true as regards current and future 
disbursements.42 
The later findings of the World Bank Inspection Panel appear to vindicate this aspect of his decision. 
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We would also argue that Warby J took an expansive view in understanding Mr O͛s ͚legitimate 
interest͛ in the case. Elaborating on how Mr O was affected, Warby J rejected the argument that Mr 
O had no legitimate interest in the case. Indeed, he argued forcefully that spatially and temporally 
Mr O ͚remained affected͛. To address the spatial point first, Warby J effectively turned on its head 
the Government͛s claim that Mr O was too physically remote from the case because he now lived in 
Kenya. He resisted what was in effect DfID͛s attempt to narrow jurisdiction and to avoid 
accountability because of the messiness and uncertainty of Mr O having fled his country.43 On the 
contrary, he said, Mr O remained affected precisely because he was someone ͚ousted from his 
ancestral land͛ and because – not despite the fact that – he was separated from relatives still at home. 
He explicitly rejected the Government͛s arguments that as a refugee from Ethiopia, Mr O had no 
legitimate interest in the case. Secondly, to address the temporal point, Warby J rejected the 
defendant͛s attempt to argue that Mr O was too far removed in time from the events complained of 
to have sufficient interest in the case. It was contended by DfID that Mr O͛s claim related to abuse 
that occurred in 2011 and 2012 and that these events predated the decisions now under challenge. In 
response, Warby J developed a plausible ͚temporal stretch͛ to recognise that Mr O was indeed 
affected.44 The claimant was, the judgment argues, legitimately concerned with ͚the Defendant͛s 
present and future policy and practice with regard to the assessment of Ethiopia͛s human rights 
record͛. The following passage sums up the judge͛s expansive approach to the spatial and temporal 
arguments launched by the Government: 
It is true that the experiences of abuse which he relates occurred in 2011 and 2012, before the 
decisions challenged in this action. He is entitled however to say that he remains affected, as 
someone who remains ousted from his ancestral land and a refugee from his home country. 
Further, he can say that he is a family member with relatives from whom he has been and 
remains separated as a result of the way the CDP has been implemented, with those relatives 
remaining somewhere in Ethiopia. 
Grounds of claim 
The relief sought by the claimant was firstly, a declaration that the defendant had acted unlawfully 
in failing to have or to apply a proper assessment process so far as Ethiopia͛s compliance with human 
rights is concerned, and secondly an order requiring the publication of the most recent assessment 
of Ethiopia͛s compliance. It is important to note that: 
͚No challenge is made, and no relief is sought, in respect of any decisions by the Defendant to 
grant aid to Ethiopia͛. 
Here we can return to Pergau Dam and distinguish the way in which the grounds of claim were 
drafted. In Pergau, a declaration that the decision of the Secretary of State for International 
Development was unlawful was sought by the World Development Movement. In O the case did 
not rest on whether the decision of the Secretary of State was ultra vires her powers in granting aid 
to Ethiopia. Rather, Mr O claimed that DfID failed to evaluate the human rights impact of its lending 
and so contributed inadvertently to abuses by supporting the villagisation scheme implemented by 
the Ethiopian government. This is a narrower framing, as we have shown above. 
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As we noted, McAuslan argued that the most important outcome of the judicial review in Pergau 
Dam was the introduction of the International Development Act 2002. This legislation provides in s 
1 that development assistance can only be provided if it is likely in the opinion of the Secretary of 
State to lead to ͚poverty reduction͛: 
The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance if he is 
satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty. 
In McAuslan͛s assessment, ͚the willingness of the court in the Pergau Dam case to extend judicial 
control to development assistance͛ led to a scramble to find ways to avoid future judicial review of 
any decision by a development minister.45 In McAuslan͛s view ͚proper scrutiny of … public 
expenditure [is now] virtually impossible͛ because the purpose for which development aid could be 
given was, as a result of the International Development Act 2002, now so widely drawn as to be 
meaningless. He described the 2002 law as giving: 
the Secretary of State very wide and hopefully unchallengeable powers to disburse aid as she 
thinks fit, so avoiding addressing the problem that she will be likely to be disbursing monies 
that she and her officials have a pretty shrewd suspicion will often be wasted or misused. She 
doesn͛t wish to be tied down by a legal framework which imposes specific duties on her which 
will have all sorts of internal British legal and accountability implications. Far better to legislate 
for a more judgeproof version of the present system.46 
Since 2002, therefore, the prospect of the Secretary of State being found to have acted unlawfully 
has been very remote. In O, the case was cast in terms of DfID͛s obligations to assess Ethiopia͛s 
compliance with human rights. The claim was not that the actions of the Secretary of State were 
ultra vires her powers. Nonetheless, despite this narrower framing, DfID launched a vigorous 
defence to the suggestion that it might be compelled by a judicial review to explain and defend its 
specific practice in discharging its duty. In response to the claimant͛s assertion that in respect of 
evaluating human rights, DfID had failed in its policy and practice, DfID argued that the claimant 
was presenting ͚a series of assertions as to how the Defendant should discharge her duty, by which 
the Claimant seeks to impose a ͞straightjacket͟ on the rational exercise of judgment by her͛.47 DfID 
argued that so long as the Secretary of State͛s decision making was rational – and the claimant in O 
did not seek to call this into question – then the courts should not be allowed to set out how she 
exercised this judgement. We elaborate on this point below. 
Rationality and the exercise of judgement 
In relation to the defendant͛s duties, the claimant made two complaints. Their first, primary 
complaint was that the defendant has acted in breach of the duty owed by any public body to take 
reasonable steps to obtain the information relevant to the discharge of its functions. Citing Secretary 
of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council,52 it was claimed by 
Mr O that in contexts involving fundamental rights, there is a need for ͚anxious scrutiny͛ and that in 
certain circumstances this duty is enhanced. When this happens, scrutiny encompasses a duty, ͚ where 
evidence calls for an explanation, to seek such an explanation͛48. It was the claimant͛s allegation that 
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the defendant had ͚no established mechanisms for collecting or assessing evidence as to Ethiopia͛s 
compliance with the conditions for the grant of aid͛.49 According to Mr O the defendant had ͚neither 
a system for assembling information itself, nor any mechanism for a third party to undertake 
inquiries on her behalf, nor any means of enabling third parties to draw relevant information to her 
attention͛. 
In response to this argument, the defendant did not dispute the existence of the duties of inquiry 
relied on by the claimant. She did, however, resist the broadening of her Tameside duty, arguing that 
this duty requires only that she take reasonable steps in carrying out her duties. According to the 
Secretary of State for International Development, the standard which the law required her to meet 
͚in discharging her functions in this regard is that of rationality and no more͛. DfID claimed that so 
long as the manner in which the duty was exercised was rational, it was empowered as a public body 
to determine ͚the manner and intensity of inquiry appropriate to the function in question͛.50 DfID 
resisted what it saw as the claimant͛s attempt to persuade the court to accept ͚a series of assertions͛ 
as to how the defendant should discharge her duty. By attempting to do this, DfID claimed, Mr O 
was seeking ͚to impose a ͞straightjacket͟ on the rational exercise of judgement͛51 relating to aid 
decisions. Although Warby J saw some merit in DfID͛s argument, he was reluctant to reject Mr O͛s 
argument as to the Secretary of State͛s exercise of her functions at this stage. Arguing that it deserved 
a full hearing, Warby J said that the claim that the defendant ͚has in effect ignored, or chosen not to 
enquire further into, factual allegations which are plainly relevant to the assessment͛ merited fuller 
consideration.52 
The court, however, rejected the claimant͛s second complaint that by using the word transparency 
in relation to aid, DfID had committed itself to making its assessments public. The court accepted 
that the defendant had made commitments to transparency in decision-making about aid, but it did 
not accept the argument that by 
using the term ͚transparency͛ in the ways that she had, the Secretary of State for International 
Development committed herself to making the PPA as a document public either in whole or in 
part, or that she had made any commitment to ͚publishing a class of document of which the 
PPA is an example. 
The court qualified its approach to revelation of the document by saying that it was prepared to 
accept that the publication might be necessary for different reasons. It could see for example that 
͚the publication of aspects of the Defendant͛s assessments of Ethiopia͛s record is a necessary 
component of a lawful process of assembling and assessing relevant evidence͛.53 The court accepted 
that DfID might have to make the documentation public but stated that it would do so if necessary 
to the lawful assembling of evidence in the instant case rather than because the court had compelled 
it to do so in order ͚to comply with her stated policy on conditionality by refusing to make the 
assessment public͛.54 
4. The case for greater scrutiny of aid 
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Those critical of judicial involvement in reviewing aid have argued that Pergau Dam constituted a 
judicial overstepping of powers. In his 2011 Mann lecture, Lord Sumption argued that in Pergau 
Dam the court ͚ might have been expected to say that the policy justification of this particular decision 
was a matter for the minister, for which he was answerable to Parliament͛.55 But, Sumption says 
disapprovingly, rather than take that stance it quashed the decision of the Foreign Secretary.56 In so 
doing, the court reserved for itself the power to assess development policy, a responsibility that is 
rightly within the power of the Secretary of State: 
They … interpreted the statute as limiting the power to grant development aid to projects that 
were a good idea. Who was to decide what was a good idea? Naturally, the Court itself. The 
practical effect was to transfer to the court the discretionary powers of the Secretary of State 
on a matter of policy and the task of assessing the project͛s merits.57 
In addition to this substantive criticism of Pergau Dam, the granting of standing to the World 
Development Movement was criticised for allowing interest groups and campaigners to bring their 
claims before the UK courts.58 
In the discussion that follows we argue, against this position, that in light of recent developments 
in development assistance, it is both necessary and desirable for courts to have oversight of aid 
lending decisions.64 We explore four interrelated reasons why judicial review of aid is important. We 
argue that at present there exist few mechanisms to allow for meaningful scrutiny of aid; we show 
that the nature of official development assistance is changing rapidly and that the broadening out of 
those involved in its disbursement necessitates judicial oversight; we argue that DfID is now a large 
and powerful government Department under a legal obligation to spend a substantial budget and that 
the increased pressure to ͚push money out of the door͛59 has increased the risks associated with aid 
decisions. We make the case that the aid relationship is unique and that the extra-territorial nature of 
aid spending demands both parliamentary and judicial involvement in scrutinising decisions. 
Lack of robust mechanisms of scrutiny 
The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 (the ODAT Act) 
constitutes a new and unprecedented commitment by the UK to an increased level of development 
assistance. However, there is no obvious model for scrutiny of the large amount of aid that DfID 
will now have not just a responsibility but also a legal obligation to disburse. In this regard, the new 
aid commitment is uncharted water.60 The current provisions for scrutinising aid, which give 
responsibility to the Commission for Aid Impact, are not adequate to the task. But, at the same time 
DfID is under a new legal obligation because of the ODAT Act 2015 to spend its large, 
newlyguaranteed budget. The Act provides for an Independent Commission on Aid Impact to assess 
the work of the DfID and report to the parliamentary select committee on international development 
on its efficiency and value for money. We have argued that scrutiny of aid decisions under this 
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arrangement are unlikely to be robust. In Pergau Dam, a judicial review enabled the courts to ask 
probing and difficult questions about the propriety of the aid given. Under the CAI mechanism, it is 
only the impact rather than the lawfulness of DfID͛s lending that will be assessed and, we would 
argue, this is not adequate fully to hold a wealthy and increasingly powerful Department to account. 
Further layers of scrutiny exist through the relevant select committee. For lending by DfID this 
would fall to the International Development Committee, and through the National Audit Office 
(NAO). Despite the purpose of the International Development Committee to provide parliamentary 
oversight of development and aid expenditure and the responsibility of the NAO to review public 
spending, neither of these bodies inquired into the decision of DfID to participate in the Ethiopian 
PSB programme. 
The UK͛s changing aid landscape 
In recent years, commentators have drawn attention to the changing nature of UK aid. There are two 
changes that merit our attention. First, the fact that more and more the aid budget is disbursed to 
multilateral organisations, such as the World Bank61 and, secondly, the implications of greater 
disbursement by non-traditional aid departments.62 There was a significant increase in multilateral 
aid in 2013–2014. In this period, DfID gave multilateral organisations 44% more in core funding 
than it did in the previous financial year. This significant change in the spending pattern of the 
Department raises important questions about whether working through multilateral organisations 
represents value for money, the desirable balance between bilateral aid (which rose by 33%) and 
multilateral aid, and once again the question of whether this is the most effective way to pursue 
poverty alleviation. Indeed, the Committee of Public Accounts had warned in 2011 that DfID might 
seek to increase multilateral aid as it did not have the capacity to manage a large increase in bilateral 
aid. In its recommendation, the NAO noted that the International Development Committee might 
wish to consider ͚whether the Department͛s discretionary multilateral programme grew in 2013– 
2014 because it did not have the capacity to manage its larger budget͛.63 
The increased channelling of aid spending to multilateral organisations, as happened in the 2013– 
2014 financial year, has caused concern.64 In 2013, 41% (£4.7 billion) of ODA was spent via 
multilateral organisations, increasing to 42.5% (£5 billion) in 2014. In contrast to bilateral ODA, 
over which the UK as donor would have control because it is earmarked to go to specific countries 
or certain programmes, multilateral ODA is perceived to be more difficult to control. This is because, 
in multilateral aid arrangements, funds from a range of national governments are pooled together. 
The funds are then used as core funding to multilateral organisations. At that point, control over the 
funds is with the multilateral body and will be used as it wishes within the terms of its mandate. The 
concern is that the original donor no longer has control over the purposes for which spending takes 
place. The money having been satisfactorily disbursed to a multilateral institution such as the World 
Bank, the EU and the United Nations Development Programme, the UK may well find itself on 
course to reach the legal target for ODA spending, but questions of effectiveness remain. Indeed, 
commentators have pointed out that when ODA is channelled through multilateral organisations, the 
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risks of waste, even corruption, are largely ignored.65 Questionable human rights records such as 
those of Rwanda and Uganda are overlooked, for example, when budgetary support is given.66 
Aid is now spent through a range of channels over which there is not always clear oversight. 
Increasingly, aid is available to departments not traditionally associated with the disbursement of 
development assistance, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy.67 Some have argued that this is a ͚stealth aid raid͛ in which other departments 
in Whitehall have attempted to access the aid budget.68 Commentators have been especially critical 
of the militarisation of aid which has involved the Ministry of Defence in particular in accessing 
funds characterised as ODA. Britain has actively lobbied the Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD to change the rules on definitions of aid spending. In February 2016, the OECD 
widened the definition of overseas development assistance (ODA) to allow for aid to be used for 
military purposes.69 If DfID͛s accountability mechanisms through the International Development 
Committee and the Commission for Aid Impact are thin, as we have argued above, it is concerning 
that currently mechanisms for monitoring non-traditional aid spending are non-existent.70 Scrutiny 
of this changing spending is critical. 
Institutional power and the pressure to spend 
The willingness judicially to review aid decisions will be critical as the implications of a large aid 
budget become apparent. Even when the rise of non-traditional aid departments is taken into account, 
it is clear that DfID will be a powerful Whitehall spender in coming years. This requires us to 
consider the implications of the pressure to keep spending under which DfID might find itself. In 
the 2013–2014 financial year, when the UK hit the OECD͛s 0.7 target but before the commitment to 
spend this percentage of GNI was enshrined in law, the Department found itself faced with a sudden 
and considerable rise in its budget. A great deal can be learned by scrutinising DfID͛s response. The 
Department effectively pushed money out of the door in the 2013–2014 financial year and questions 
were raised by the NAO about the lack of strategic planning and the likely effectiveness of these 
funds.71 The NAO reiterated this point in its 2017 report, stressing the ongoing need for greater 
coherence and scrutiny of aid spending.72 This situation is in all likelihood aggravated by the new 
legal target. DfID is under a legal obligation to spend its increased budget, and although it now 
shares the aid budget with 14 other departments, it is responsible for much of the aid budget (around 
80%). Politically, it will want to avoid any underspend that might suggest it cannot make use of the 
increased funding it has been promised. The pressure to spend is likely to increase in coming years. 
How this pressure can be reconciled with strategic and effective aid remains to be seen. It was 
suggested in relation to the O case that the Department knew there were human rights problems 
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associated with a programme to which it was the main contributor, but that it nonetheless pursued 
the programme under pressure to disburse aid. As Rawlence put it: 
the claim put together by Leigh Day alleged that DfID had failed to follow its own human rights 
policy. In effect, they claimed, DfID had knowingly ignored human rights problems in order 
to keep spending. 
The exceptionalism of the aid relationship 
In Pergau Dam, Rose LJ observed that in the absence of a challenge by the pressure group, it was 
hard to see who else would question the decision, and cited ͚the importance of vindicating the rule 
of law͛ as a key argument in favour of granting standing to the World Development Movement.73 
Given the shifts in aid spending explored above, Rose LJ͛s observation is more pertinent than ever. 
Moreover, as we have argued above, parliamentary scrutiny of aid is evidently not robust enough to 
ensure accountability for aid spending. The NAO reports of 2015 and 2017 both echo our concerns. 
In the specific case of lending to Ethiopia, parliamentary scrutiny (by the International Development 
Committee or the NAO) does not appear to have taken place. No questions were raised through 
parliamentary fora about the UK͛s involvement in the country, despite the concerns of human rights 
groups: ͚DfID is perhaps the least accountable ministry: its operations are far away and its 
beneficiaries do not vote in the UK͛.74 For Elliott, ͚[j]udicial review constitutes such a form of 
participation … it allows those with the necessary means and expertise to advocate on behalf of those 
whose marginalization deprives them of the opportunity adequately to speak up for themselves͛.75 
Parallels can be drawn here with the Bribery Act 2010, which seeks to create a legal framework for 
intervention in cases where ͚the alleged infractions did not take place on UK soil͛.76 The willingness 
legislatively to intervene in these cases – which do not concern UK government spending – surely 
strengthens the case for judicial oversight of UK aid spending. 
5. The impact of O 
The question of how to assess the impact of judicial review on the behaviour of individuals and 
institutions is complex.77 This is especially true when the case does not go to full judicial review, but 
does experience some preliminary judicial scrutiny. Had the case gone to a full hearing, the courts 
might have set out a framework of obligations to which the Secretary of State must adhere.78 This 
would have been a significant development for the development ministry which, in contrast to other 
government departments, is unaccustomed to judicial review cases. An intervention by the court at 
full judicial review would clearly have constituted an undesirable straitjacket on the Secretary of 
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State͛s judgement. The risk for DfID was that ͚the court would force it to design and implement a 
transparent policy for assessing human rights͛.79 
The longer-term impact of the case is more difficult to gauge. To what extent and how will DfID 
͚internalize … judicial review norms and values͛?80 It seems plausible to argue that the case will have 
a significant impact on the way in which this government department operates. The determination 
of DfID to resist the case on all grounds demonstrates the power of scrutiny by the judiciary not just 
in this case but more widely for the DfID bureaucracy.81 As Jennings has written: 
The legal review … may force greater transparency on the decisions being made … it will put 
pressure on DfID to clarify just how seriously it takes its ͚good governance͛ mantra when 
deciding on aid spending.82 
In the absence of full judicial review, the opportunity was missed to elaborate on what the 
Department͛s monitoring of human rights should amount to. In the absence of this clarification, it is 
difficult to know how DfID͛s monitoring of its programmes works in practice. This gives rise to the 
impression that the Department is prioritising spending over human rights compliance, and that in 
so doing may be overlooking difficult human rights issues across the world. Patrick McAuslan 
argued that the then Overseas Development Administration (later the Department for International 
Development), reeling after the Malaysian dam affair, worked to make sure that its aid decisions 
were thereafter ͚Pergau proof͛. For the next 20 years, the chances of an adverse judicial decision 
concerning DfID were remote. In Re O, the Department came close once again to being held to 
account by the courts for the way in which the Secretary of State for International Development 
exercises her power. DfID has avoided the straightjacket of accountability on this occasion but will 
be on notice that judicial scrutiny of its large budget may now be more likely. Internally, the 
Department will no doubt be reviewing its readiness to respond to judicial review. 
Conclusion 
By attempting to open aid spending up to judicial scrutiny for the first time in over 20 years, the O 
case constitutes something of a landmark. The UK is now one of the OECD͛s largest disbursers of 
aid. DfID will become an increasingly powerful Whitehall Department in years to come, but most 
of those affected by its decisions are overseas. They have few means to hold the Department to 
account for its lending decisions. We have argued that litigation has a role to play in steering policy 
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and decisionmaking on development spending. In this regard, the O case constitutes an important 
milestone in developing accountability for aid decisions. 
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